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SUMMARY
The introduction of high bandwidth demanding services such as multimedia services has resulted in
important changes on how services in the Internet are accessed and what Quality of Experience requirements
(i.e. limited amount of packet loss, fairness between connections) are expected to ensure a smooth service
delivery. In the current congestion control mechanisms, misbehaving TCP stacks can easily achieve an
unfair advantage over the other connections by not responding to Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
warnings, sent by the AQM system when congestion in the network is imminent. In this article, we present
an accountability mechanism that holds connections accountable for their actions through the detection
and penalization of misbehaving TCP stacks with the goal of restoring the fairness in the network. The
mechanism is specifically targeted at deployment in multimedia access networks as these environments are
most prone to fairness issues due to misbehaving TCP stacks (i.e., long-lived connections and a moderate
connection pool size), We argue that a cognitive approach is best suited to cope with the dynamicity of
the environment and therefore present a cognitive detection algorithm, that combines machine learning
algorithms to classify connections into well-behaving and misbehaving profiles. This is in turn used by a
differentiated AQM mechanism that provides a different treatment for the well-behaving and misbehaving
profiles. The performance of the cognitive accountability mechanism has been characterized both in terms
of the accuracy of the cognitive detection algorithm and the overall impact of the mechanism on the network
fairness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s Internet has undergone a major shift since its original adoption: narrowband services such
as web browsing and e-mails are not the most popular services any more. Instead, they have been
replaced with multimedia services such as video streaming and on-line gaming, which are all very
bandwidth intensive and require strict Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees to ensure a smooth
service delivery. Even small drops in bandwidth can deteriorate the quality as perceived by the
end user, often called the Quality of Experience (QoE). For example, a drop in bandwidth of a
video transmission can lead to visual artifacts or play-out buffer starvations which is visible through
freezes of the video.
As the demand for bandwidth in the Internet grows, and especially in access networks, so does
the number of connections with a large volume [1]. Although short lived connections (mice) still
exist plentiful, the introduction of video services also results in an increasing number of long lived
connections (elephants). For example, the popular HTTP Adaptive Streaming techniques, use HTTP
connections that last at least a few seconds to transmit segments of the videos. One connection is
often reused for the transmission of multiple video segments, which leads to connections that can
last for minutes and transmit megabytes of data. These longer lasting connections increase the need
for techniques that ensure an adequate fairness between connections. The longer connections last,
the more they can take advantage of their achieved rate (e.g., by starving newly started connections)
as they are further away from their start-up phase, which is often characterized by a slow start
behavior. Enforcing fairness between connections is therefore becoming more and more important
in today’s Internet.
Today, the TCP protocol is by far the most widely used transport protocol, especially for video
services where more and more progressive download based mechanisms are used. Although the
widely used TCP protocols all contain congestion avoidance algorithms that, in theory, should
enforce fairness between connections, practice has shown that existing differences between TCP
stacks result in important limitations. This is motivated by one of the IRTF’s recent RFCs [2],
discussing the open research issues in internet congestion control, which identifies misbehaving
senders and receivers as one of the 7 main challenges in congestion control. Furthermore, the
authors of [3] show that the presence of a single misbehaving connection can lead to a collapse of
the throughput of other connections. According to them, in the worst case, the achieved gain of the
misbehaving connection is a factor 30 million. As TCP only resides on the terminals of a connection,
a network relies on the correctness of the TCP’s congestion avoidance algorithms. However, it is not
in the TCP stack’s best interest to feature such altruistic behavior. Therefore, TCP implementations
can exploit this trust to achieve a higher throughput while violating TCP’s congestion avoidance
principles, at the cost of the throughput of other connections. As we will show in this article, such
behavior can even be inflicted without modifying the implementation of a TCP/IP stack in the kernel.
TCP stacks that feature these limitations are called misbehaving, because they do not comply with
the agreed upon reaction to congestion signals. Without in-network management, it is not possible
to adequately manage misbehaving TCP stacks.
Instead of solely trusting on the congestion avoidance behavior of the terminals, more intelligence
is often introduced into the network’s routers through the Active Queue Management (AQM)
paradigm. Instead of only dropping packets when a router’s queue is full, an AQM system can
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Figure 1. Overview of the role of a cognitive mechanism on top of an existing AQM system to introduce
a higher level of fairness. Individual TCP connections are monitored to detect misbehaving TCP stacks
(senders or receivers), which can then be penalized to favor the well-behaving TCP stacks.
drop packets earlier or can signal the existence of congestion to the terminals through the Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) [4], which marks the packets by setting a flag in the packet header.
The TCP sender is then expected to respond to this congestion signal by lowering its rate, provided
that the TCP receiver behaves properly and echoes the congestion signals. Additionally, by assigning
the connections to different traffic classes, a router can also choose to prioritize one traffic class over
the other.
The flexibility provided by an AQM system can thus be exploited to introduce a greater level
of fairness between connections. If it is possible to detect misbehaving TCP stacks, an autonomic
differentiated AQM management can be introduced that distinguishes between well-behaving and
misbehaving stacks to penalize misbehaving TCP connections and reward well-behaving TCP
connections. As this detection consists of finding different behavior between connections, we argue
that a cognitive approach is best suited. In this article, we provide an answer to the following
research questions: (1) How can the occurrence of misbehaving TCP stacks be detected inside
a router’s AQM system? (2) Can the penalization of misbehaving connections lead to a better
fairness between connections? and (3) How fast and accurate is the response of a differentiated
AQM management mechanism?
In this article, we propose a cognitive mechanism, which we call a cognitive accountability
mechanism, that is able to detect misbehaving TCP senders and receivers and penalizes them to
achieve a better fairness between the individual connections. The cognitive mechanism can be
deployed on top of a traditional AQM management scheme and is transparent to the other nodes in
the network. It is mainly targeted for deployment in an access network environment, where the gain
that can be achieved by misbehaving is considerable. As such, it specifically targets environments
where the connections have a considerable duration (i.e., more than 1 second) and a moderate
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number of concurrent connections (i.e., a few thousand or less). The cognitive accountability
mechanism provides a service to the operator by altering the forwarding of packets to improve
the fairness. The main idea is that the algorithm holds subscribers accountable for their actions by
penalizing misbehaving connections. A general overview of the proposed cognitive mechanism is
illustrated in Figure 1. The major contributions of this article are the following. First, we propose
a machine learning based detection algorithm that monitors the traffic passing through a router and
decides whether or not a TCP stack is misbehaving. The detection algorithm uses a combination of
outlier detection and clustering based on extracted flow statistics to find different behavioral profiles
and an intelligent labeling mechanism to distinguish between well-behaving and misbehaving
stacks. Second, we present a differentiated AQM mechanism that penalizes misbehaving stacks
by treating the misbehaving flows as non-ECN flows. Third, we evaluated the cognitive mechanism
by deploying it on a NS-2 based simulation environment under different network configurations
(e.g., multiple RTT configurations). The performance evaluation characterizes the accuracy of the
detection algorithm and identifies the obtained gain of the differentiated AQM mechanism in terms
of improved fairness for different types of misbehaving stacks.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant work in the
fields of congestion control and machine learning based management. Section 3 characterizes the
destructive effect of misbehaving TCP stacks on the obtained fairness. Section 4 and Section 5
present the cognitive mechanism’s detection algorithm and differentiated AQM mechanism,
respectively. Both the detection and penalization algorithms are evaluated in Section 6 and the article
is concluded in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Congestion control algorithms are probably the most widely available feedback loop algorithms
available in the current Internet. As the Internet connects users from all over the world, competing
for the same bandwidth, already from the Internet’s early adoption it became clear that, in order
to guarantee a reliable and fair data transfer, the rate at which the competing sources are sending
needs to be controlled. Due to the distributed nature of the Internet and thus the lack of a centralized
manager, these congestion control algorithms must apply adaptive heuristic algorithms that estimate
the network load and react by changing their rate on the sign of congestion. Some key papers
from Jacobson [5] and Chiu and Jain [6] highlighted the gain of an adaptive algorithm, called
Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD), that linearly increases the rate in the absence of
congestion and exponentially decreases the rate in the presence of congestion.
In today’s Internet, congestion control algorithms are typically deployed both on the terminals
(i.e., the end users) of the network as in the network itself. At the terminals, congestion control
in the TCP protocol was standardized in [7] and the concept of a congestion window, denoting
the maximum rate at which a sender may transmit, was introduced. Since then, congestion control
algorithms have found their way in all TCP implementations used, such as TCP New Reno [8] and
TCP CUBIC.
In the network itself, the introduction of AQM has led to a finer control on the traffic that passes
through the routers. Instead of using DropTail queues, which simply drops packets once the queue
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is full, Random Early Detection (RED) [9] algorithms and variants such as BLUE [10] maintain an
exponentially weighted average value of the queue length and base their dropping probability on the
average queue length. These alternate queuing algorithms have the effect that the amount of packet
drops, which is a signal of congestion for most TCP congestion control algorithms, exponentially
increases as the load increases. By combining RED with the ECN mechanism, other congestion
warnings than packet drops can be given to TCP terminals without inflicting data loss.
The growing diversity in congestion control on one hand and the increasing importance of
achieving fairness on the other hand has led to modeling approaches where the interaction between
TCP congestion control and AQM is analytically modeled [11, 12]. Kelly et al. [13] showed that
a TCP congestion control algorithm on one hand and AQM scheme on the other hand can be
modeled as two separate components, a primal and dual component, that both try to maximize a
utility function. Depending on the implementation of the congestion control algorithm, other utility
functions can be provided. In striving to maximize their separate utility functions, Kelly showed that
they reach an equilibrium which corresponds to different fairness levels depending on the specifics
of the utility functions.
While these different levels of fairness can be characterized off-line with the knowledge of the
implementation details of the congestion control algorithms, for a router in an on-line scenario there
is no way of knowing these utility functions and the corresponding achieved fairness. Therefore, this
is a sub-optimal solution for a network provider: he typically wants network fairness that does not
depend on the type of congestion control algorithms used. As he has no control over the terminals
in the network, misbehaving TCP stacks can deteriorate the quality of other, well-behaving, TCP
stacks [14].
In this article, we focus on unresponsive flows caused by misbehaving ECN senders or receivers.
This type of misbehaving has received much attention as the ECN mechanism can easily be
exploited to ignore ECN signals without requiring any change in the kernel’s implementation. This
has led to an extension of ECN, called ECN-nonce, defined by the IETF in [15]. However, to the best
of the authors knowledge, ECN-nonce has not yet been significantly deployed. ECN-nonce enables
(a sender) to check the integrity of a receiver. The authors of [16] extend the ECN-nonce technique
to also support misbehaving receivers in multicast scenarios. However, ECN-nonce relies on the
integrity of the server, which is sometimes not the case. Our approach assumes both misbehaving
senders and receivers. Moreover, performing the same integrity check by an AQM system in a router
can be challenging. Our approach is specifically designed to be deployed on top of an existing AQM
system. As such, we believe that our approach can be complementary to ECN-nonce, where ECN-
nonce is deployed at the end systems and our approach provides an additional check (also including
misbehaving senders) in the network.
More recently, the need for effective congestion management by ISPs and a possible way forward
has been published in an informational RFC (RFC6057 [17]). In [17], the connection management
system of a large cable broadband Internet Service Provider, Comcast, is discussed. While the
approach is specifically applied to cable networks, its approach contains enough generic blocks to be
applicable to other networks as well. The Comcast approach tries to improve the network fairness by
lowering the priority of users that caused high volumes of traffic during the last recent minutes. The
effect is that these users are more likely to observe packet loss when congestion occurs. Similar
to the Comcast approach, our approach also penalizes users that cause high volumes of traffic
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by changing their priority. In our case disabling their ECN marking enforces this. However, our
approach differs from the Comcast approach in two ways. First, we focus on misbehaving senders
and receivers that deliberately want to increase the traffic at the cost of others. Instead, the Comcast
also penalizes users who diverge from the average amount of throughput that can be observed in
the system. Second, we do not only base our decision whether or not to penalize users based on the
achieved throughput. Instead, other flow statistics such as the RTT or ECN statistics are taken into
account as well. This makes our approach less protocol agnostic, but increases the accuracy and
effectiveness of the approach considerably.
Recently, several extensions have been proposed that optimize TCP congestion avoidance
algorithms for ECN-enabled connections. These extensions alter the way end-terminals respond to
the ECN congestion signals. The ECN-hat proposal [18] allows a TCP sender to cut its congestion
window by a smaller factor than 2 upon reception of a congestion signal, as echoed by the TCP
receiver. ECN-hat maintains an exponentially weighted moving average that denotes the reduction
factor, which is between 1 and 2. An evolution of the ECN-hat proposal, called Data Center
TCP [19], allows a TCP receiver to not only echo the existence of congestion but also the extent of
that congestion. The TCP sender uses this echoed information to enable a more fine grained control
of the congestion window. As both of these proposals are (i) still in an experimental phase and
(ii) have a deployment in data centers as main target (in contrast to our access network deployment
target), they were not studied in this article. However, as they also influence the way ECN signals are
echoed and how TCP senders respond to these ECN signals, they can potentially result in important
detection differences. A performance evaluation of this type of extensions is therefore an interesting
part of future work.
One interesting approach that has recently been proposed to come to increased fairness in
connectionless network is the introduction of more detailed causal congestion information. The
Congestion Exposure (ConEx) approach [20, 21], originally introduced by Bob Briscoe [22],
enables TCP end-terminals to truthfully expose the congestion level they are expected to introduce
into the network. The ConEx protocol can be seen as an independent protocol, which is orthogonal to
techniques such as ECN. The Re-ECN protocol [23] is an implementation of the ConEx concept in
an ECN-enabled environment. Re-ECN re-inserts the congestion feedback that was received from
the TCP receivers into the forwarding path. Based on this more detailed feedback information,
AQM algorithms can provide more intelligent and effective actions to maximize the fairness
between connections. As such, re-ECN is in itself not a solution to fairness but provides the first
step towards more intelligent actions. In terms of deployment, re-ECN requires modifications to
the sender itself. Alternatively, a proxy can mimic the required modifications to the sender if
needed. For more information about re-ECN, we refer to [24, 25]. With respect to our approach,
the inclusion of added feedback into the downstream direction can only increase the accuracy
of detecting misbehaving TCP senders or receivers. However, changes would be necessary to
the detection algorithm to incorporate this additional feedback. As such, both techniques should
positively influence each other. In this article, we focused on the currently deployed combination
of ECN and TCP congestion avoidance techniques: the combined study with Re-ECN or other,
alternative, ConEx implementations is part of future work.
Both [26] and [27] address the issue of improving the fairness between connections, either
through the design of a new AQM algorithm or the adaptation of RED, respectively. There, both
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approaches are focused on penalizing misbehaving connections in the form of misbehaving UDP
connections. The Pre-Congestion Notification mechanism (PCN) [28], which is a measurement
based admission control system, also supports flow termination. PCN is mainly targeted at inelastic
(e.g., UDP-based) flows. In that way, PCN can perform penalization actions to unresponsive UDP
flows. In this article, we focus on misbehaving TCP connections. Kuzmanovic et. al [29] study
misbehaving TCP receivers. However, their work focuses on TCP congestion control algorithms
that are receiver oriented. They show that receiver-driven TCP has its potential but that a balance
must be found between enforcement mechanisms and a complete trust of the endpoints. The issue
of misbehaving behavior in the generation of SACKs is studied by [30]. The approach uses TBIT to
fingerprint connections that misbehave in the SACK generation. Their main goal is to identify and
document the types of misbehaving stacks, not to correct them. In [31], misbehaving TCP receivers
are studied. The authors present a modification to the original TCP protocol to deal with different
types of misbehaving receivers. Similarly, Chan et. al [32] address misbehaving TCP receivers
by generating a secret key at the sender. The TCP sender is thus responsible for enforcing the
correctness of the receiver. In contrast to both previous approaches, our approach focuses both
on misbehaving senders and receivers. Moreover, our approach is deployed in the network and
thus does not require any change to the TCP protocol itself. This facilitates its deployment and
incremental adoption.
We argue that a cognitive approach, consisting of an unsupervised machine learning algorithm,
is most suited to detect misbehaving TCP stacks. This is because of its adaptive nature to changing
circumstances and because the detection of a misbehaving stack is in essence a clustering problem
that finds the cluster of good stacks versus the cluster of bad stacks. Machine learning algorithms
have been successfully applied to network management domains such as improved routing [33],
topology control [34] and anomaly detection [35, 36].
More specifically related to the problem of congestion control, the authors in [37] use a
classification method to identify the type of application. This classification is based on statistical
features of the connections such as the length of the packets and the inter arrival times. In our
approach, we use similar statistical information of a connection to decide on the misbehaving of
a connection. In [38], a classification mechanism is proposed that is able to distinguish between
losses related to congestion and losses related to link errors. As many congestion control algorithms
interpret packet loss as a sign of congestion, the proposed classification method is able to filter
out the data losses that have nothing to do with congestion, which increases the throughput of the
TCP connections. The authors of [39] tackle the same problem but use Hidden Markov Models and
Expectation Maximization algorithms as machine learning techniques. Our proposed technique is
complementary to these techniques as it can only benefit from detecting misbehaving connections
and hence take more accurate decisions on congestion signals.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we discuss the impact of introducing misbehaving ECN-based senders and receivers
into a set of TCP connections. We first provide a summary of the ECN extension and then describe
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how TCP stacks can misbehave by not responding to ECN signals. Finally, we discuss the used
experimental setup and characterize the gain they can achieve by misbehaving.
3.1. Overview of the Explicit Congestion Notification extension
ECN [4] is an extension to the standard IP and TCP protocol. Its main goal is to introduce the
ability of explicit signaling when congestion occurs in the network to the end terminals. Without
ECN, congestion is signaled implicitly by the dropping of packets. While traditional congestion
avoidance algorithms are able to respond to these implicit congestion signals, this often results in
unnecessary retransmissions. In turn these retransmissions lead to an increased latency for those
retransmissions, and thus a higher jitter for the affected connections. ECN has the advantage that
it alleviates those problems by piggybacking a congestion signal with regular packets instead of
dropping those packets.
The congestion signals are send by marking the regular stream of packets passing through a
router. In this context, marking means setting one or more bits in the IP or TCP header. In summary,
ECN operates as follows: when congestion occurs in the network, packets are marked by setting
the ’Congestion Experienced’ flag in the IP header. This flag is raised by setting two bits of the
DiffServ field in the IPv4 or IPv6 header. Which packets are marked depends on the active queue
management algorithm used in the router. For example in RED, the probability that is calculated to
define the dropping probability (if the average queue length is between min and max) also defines
the marking probability. Hence, the packets are in this case marked instead of dropped. Only under
very high load conditions, i.e. if the max threshold of the RED algorithm is exceeded, packets are
dropped. While the congestion signal itself (the ’Congestion Experienced’ flag) is encoded in the
IP header, the higher layer transport protocol is supposed to respond to these congestion signals.
TCP supports ECN through two flags in the TCP header. For ECN-enabled TCP connections, the
TCP receiver is expected to echo these congestion signals back to the sender. This is done through
the ECN Echo (ECE) flag. The TCP sender is expected to respond to this ECE signal, as for packet
drop, by lowering its congestion window and confirming the decrease of the congestion window
through a Congestion Window Reduced (CWR) flag.
3.2. Misbehaving TCP stacks
We introduced different types of misbehaving TCP stacks by altering the response of these TCP
stacks to ECN signals. We investigate both misbehaving TCP receivers and TCP senders.
3.2.1. Misbehaving TCP receivers
Partially ignoring ECN messages A TCP receiver can easily exploit the ECN mechanism by
ignoring some or all ECN signals he receives. In this case, the congestion signals are not echoed
back to the TCP sender, and he cannot adapt its congestion window leading to a higher throughput
until the load becomes too high and the TCP sender responds to actual packet loss. After that, the rate
is again gradually increased until packet loss is again experienced. When only a fraction of the TCP
stacks ignore these messages, they can achieve a higher throughput because other TCP stacks will
lower their send rate earlier. In this case, the misbehaving TCP stack is positioned at the receiver
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side instead of the sender side. Note that an implementation of such misbehaving TCP stack is
straightforward and does not even require modifications of the TCP/IP stack in the kernel. Received
packets can easily be captured and modified to remove the ECN flag, at which point they are sent
to the actual TCP stack. In our experiments, we varied the percentage of ECN messages that are
ignored to introduce levels of misbehaving. In the remainder of this article, this type of misbehaving
TCP stacks are abbreviated as IgnoreRecX, where X is the percentage of ECN messages that are
ignored. Hence, IgnoreRec30 will ignore 30% of all ECN messages.
Adaptively ignoring ECN messages Instead of ignoring random ECN messages, a second type
of investigated misbehaving TCP stacks performs a more adaptive ignoring of ECN messages. This
type of ECN flag manipulation takes place on the receiver side, but assumes that the receiver knows
the configuration parameters and current queue size of the router sending the ECN messages at all
time. Note that this type of information is hard to estimate for the receiver. However, this type of
misbehaving denotes a more advanced ignoring as it continuously switches between a misbehaving
and well-behaving mode, which is of interest from a theoretical viewpoint, as it is harder to detect
this behavior. In our experiments, the AdaptiveIgnore component was deployed just after the queue
to allow it to have access to the queue length.
In this case, the ECN Congestion Experienced flag is only ignored in situations where the queue
is not in an extreme load mode. These situations are denoted by the length of the queue with respect
to the RED thresholds. The idea is that the misbehaving stack pushes the queue to the limit, without
actually causing losses. Therefore, ECN messages are ignored until the queue length is higher than
the RED max threshold, at which a fraction of the packets of the packets are being dropped by
the queue. When this RED max threshold is exceeded, the ignoring of congestion warnings is
temporarily suspended which makes the TCP stack behave as a regular TCP stack again. Once
the decrease in the queue length is sufficient, denoted by the RED min threshold, the misbehaving
is again enabled and all ECN messages are ignored. In the remainder of this article, this type of
misbehaving TCP stacks is abbreviated as AdaptiveIgnore.
3.2.2. Misbehaving TCP senders Similar to the misbehaving of a TCP receiver, it is also possible
for a TCP sender to misbehave. In terms of ECN behavior, a TCP sender can choose to ignore the
messages containing ECE flags and not to respond to these congestion warnings. The rationale
here is that the misbehaving TCP sender tries to receive an advantage over the well-behaving
TCP senders by depending on the other well-behaving TCP senders to lower their rate. If this
succeeds, a misbehaving TCP sender can potentially obtain a higher throughput compared to the
other connections. Obviously, even a misbehaving TCP sender will ultimately need to lower its
rate. This happens when it increases its rate up to the level that congestion related losses occur.
Similarly, to the implementation of a misbehaving TCP receiver, this type of misbehaving can easily
be implemented without requiring any change to the original TCP/IP stack. It is sufficient to capture
packets sent to the TCP sender and unset the ECE flag. In our experiments, we define this type of
misbehaving TCP stack as an IgnoreSenX, where X is the percentage of ECE flags that are ignored.
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Figure 2. Used network topology for all experiments with a central bottleneck of 100 Mbps. The topology
consists of 3 sites, with various RTTs, that request content from a single TCP sender site. 25% of all TCP
receivers experience an additional bottleneck of 20 Mbps.
3.3. Experimental setup
Before characterizing the gain misbehaving TCP senders and receivers can achieve by ignoring
congestion warnings, we first discuss the experimental environment that will be used throughout
this article. The above discussed types of misbehaving TCP senders and TCP receivers were
implemented in the NS-2 network simulator (version 2.35) [40]. As TCP implementation, we used
NS-2’s Full TCP implementation with ECN support. The investigated topology is illustrated in
Figure 2. The topology models TCP receivers in 3 domains which are connected to a single domain
of TCP senders. There is a bottleneck of 100 Mbps between the TCP sender and the 3 sites of TCP
receivers. Each of the 3 domains has a configurable delay, denoted as RTT1, RTT2 and RTT3. At
each site, 25% of all connections are limited by another bottleneck of 20 Mbps.
The start times of the connections were modeled using a Weibull process with scale λ and shape
k, which defined the inter arrival times of the connections in milliseconds. To vary the connection’s
duration, a Pareto distribution with scale xm and shape α was used that defines the number of
bytes that each connection sends. During the experiments, the parameters were set as follows:
λ = 143, k = 0.9, xm = 1500 and α = 1. Note that this corresponds with an average inter-arrival
time of 0.15 seconds and an average connection duration in the order of a few seconds. The Weibull
distribution was modeled based on findings in [41]. The share of misbehaving nodes (senders or
receivers) was varied in the experiments. The assignment of the TCP receivers on the different sites
and rate-limiting bottlenecks and whether or not they were misbehaving was done through a uniform
distribution. All experiments were repeated 100 times.
3.4. Experienced fairness
We investigated the impact of the three different misbehaving TCP stacks on the experienced
fairness. We focus on the gain in throughput they achieve by misbehaving, compared to the well-
behaving TCP stacks. We characterize the relative gain: hence, a gain of 200% means that the
throughput is 2 times higher than its well-behaving counterparts. In this case, the round trip times
of the three sites was set to the same value, i.e. 20 msec.
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Figure 3. Relative gain of misbehaving TCP stacks given an increasing number of concurrent connections.
As the number of consecutive connections is increased, the gain obtained by misbehaving TCP stacks
diminishes.
Figure 3 illustrates the relative gain of misbehaving TCP connections given an increasing number
of concurrent connections. In this experiment, we introduced 50% of misbehaving connections into
the total connection pool. As shown, the biggest gain can be achieved when the connection pool
is limited: with only 2 connections available, the gain a misbehaving stack achieves can be up to
15 times larger than the concurrent well-behaving stack. As the connection pool increases, the gain
that can be achieved by misbehaving decreases. However, even for a moderate connection pool, the
gain is still notable. For example, for 500 simultaneous connections, a misbehaving TCP sender
that ignores all congestion warnings can still increase its throughput with a factor 2.44 compared
to the well-behaving connections. When comparing the different types of misbehaving TCP stacks,
we see that TCP receivers achieve a smaller gain than misbehaving TCP senders. This is because
the TCP sender controls the rate: if it decides to ignore congestion warnings, the impact on the
rate is immediately visible. Additionally, the AdaptiveIgnore type of misbehaving receiver is able
to achieve a slightly higher rate than the IgnoreRec100 variant, but the difference is limited.
In the used network model, the number of bytes that was sent by the TCP connection was varied
using a Pareto distribution. Together with a different number of concurrent connections this resulted
in a varying connection duration. Figure 4 shows the relative gain of misbehaving stacks as a
function of an increasing connection duration of those misbehaving TCP stacks. In this case, the
relative gain was averaged over all kinds of connection pool sizes. As shown, short misbehaving
connections are not really able to influence the throughput of well-behaving connections. Only if the
connection duration of misbehaving connections increases to 1 second and higher, actual gains can
be made by misbehaving. When comparing the types of misbehaving TCP stacks with each other,
the same observations as in Figure 3 can be made. Misbehaving TCP senders are able to achieve a
higher relative gain than misbehaving TCP receivers and the AdaptiveIgnore type of misbehaving
stacks achieves a slightly higher gain than the other misbehaving TCP receivers.
In summary, these results illustrate two important points: First, all misbehaving connections
do achieve a significant gain at the cost of well-behaving connections. Second, the impact of
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Figure 4. Relative gain of misbehaving TCP stacks given an increasing connection duration.
misbehaving connections is most notable when the number of concurrent connections is limited
and the duration of the misbehaving connections is considerable. Misbehaving stacks can easily
achieve a gain of a factor 15. However, in other cases (less than 1,000 connections or connection
durations between 1 - 10 seconds) the relative gain is also significant. If these constraints are not
met, there is no real gain in misbehaving.
4. DETECTING MISBEHAVING STACKS
From the previous section it is clear that it is important to adequately respond to misbehaving TCP
stacks as they can significantly decrease the fairness between connections. To do this, it is first
required to detect the connections that are misbehaving. Once detected, specific countermeasures
can be taken to decrease the throughput of these connections and improve the fairness. In this
section, we propose a cognitive algorithm to perform such a detection. The cognitive algorithm
labels incoming connections as being misbehaving, well-behaving or unknown based on flow based
statistics, collected from the traffic that passes through.
An overview of the detection algorithm and penalization component that uses the detection
algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5. Based on a combination of clustering and outlier detection, the
connections are divided into several clusters, called profiles. Afterwards, these profiles are labelled
as being well-behaving, misbehaving or unknown. Note that, although in reality the TCP stacks
that belong to this connection will misbehave or not, we focus on the labelling of misbehaving
connections instead of nodes. The reason for this is, because of techniques such as NAT, we have no
ability to know whether multiple TCP stacks are behind the same IP address or not. The algorithm
itself is an iterative process of 4 steps: connection monitoring, outlier detection, clustering and
labeling of misbehaving connections.
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Figure 5. Overview of the detection algorithm and penalization component.
4.1. Step 1: Connection monitoring
To distinguish between well-behaving and misbehaving TCP stacks, the detection algorithm extracts
six statistics from each flow during a given time window W and uses them to perform the clustering
and outlier detection in the subsequent steps. Through these six statistics we are able to distinguish
between well-behaving and misbehaving nodes. Note that the detection algorithm monitors both the
upstream and downstream of connections. As such, it assumes that both directions pass through the
same cognitive accountability mechanism. As our accountability mechanism is specifically targeted
for a deployment in an access network this assumption does hold.
• CWR ratio: The connection’s CWR count is measured downstream (i.e., from TCP sender to
TCP receiver) and denotes the number of packets containing the CWR flag in the last time
window W. As such, it captures the signaling of congestion window reduced events. The
CWR count is normalized by calculating the ratio between packets containing the CWR flag
and the total amount of packets received during the time window W for that connection.
The CWR ratio will mainly be influenced by misbehaving senders and to a lesser extent
by misbehaving receivers. Misbehaving senders that ignore ECE flags will not lower their
rate, which will result in a lower number of congestion window reduced events, captured by
the CWR flags. Analogously, misbehaving receivers that ignore CE flags will trick a well-
behaving or misbehaving sender to not lower its rate, which again results in a lower CWR
count.
• ECE ratio: Similar to the CWR count, the ECE count denotes the number of packets
containing the ECE flag during W. It is measured upstream (from receiver to sender) and
is normalized by dividing it by the total number of upstream packets received for that
connection. The main driver for a change in the ECE ratio is a misbehaving receiver. If a
misbehaving receiver ignores CE flags, the CE flag will not be echoed to the sender, resulting
in a drop in the ECE ratio.
• Round Trip Time (RTT): The above features allow distinguishing between well-behaving and
misbehaving nodes if all flows are homogeneous. However, the heterogeneity of flows, caused
by different round trip times and/or bottlenecks on other locations than the one which the
algorithm is deployed on, can also lead to differences in CWR and ECE ratio. The RTT is
known to be inverse proportional to the obtained throughput. A higher RTT will thus lead to a
lower connection’s throughput. To distinguish between those cases, we use the RTT of a flow
as a third attribute. Unlike the CWR and ECE ratio, the RTT is more difficult to characterize.
To characterize this value, we use a previously proposed algorithm, called ANTMA [42],
that allows estimating the RTT of TCP connections from an intermediate node on the path
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between sender and receiver. We previously showed that ANTMA has an accuracy of 99.5%
in calculating the RTT of a flow in random loss scenarios.
• Connection’s duration: During the startup-phase of a TCP connection, the other flow statistics
such as CWR and ECE ratio can only marginally characterize the connection’s behavior. The
connection’s duration is therefore also taken into account to be able to filter out these early
measurements.
• Connection’s rate: As the connection’s rate is one of the most impacted parameters by
misbehaving nodes, we also extract the rate of each connection. This value is not used for
clustering but aids in labeling the clusters as discussed in Section 4.4.
• Average number of acknowledged packets per ACK: This value is a configuration parameter
on the TCP receiver and denotes after how many consecutive packets are acknowledged with
one cumulative ACK. In many cases this value will be 2. Monitoring this is easy by making
a small modification to the ANTMA algorithm. Similar to the connection’s rate, this value is
not used as a feature for clustering but is needed by the labeling algorithm.
As we will show in Section 6, this attribute set allows distinguishing between well-behaving and
misbehaving nodes. Note that, although the heterogeneity of connections due to differences in RTTs
is addressed by monitoring the connection’s RTT using ANTMA, we are not able to distinguish
between connections that suffer from a bottleneck further up or down the connection’s path. This is
however addressed in Section 4.4, where the labeling of clusters to misbehaving, well-behaving or
unknown connections is discussed. Note that we monitor the connections and extract the statistics
at a low frequency, i.e. once very second. This means that we do not characterize an immediate
response of a TCP stack after a congestion signal, but rather investigate a more aggregate behavior
that distinguishes potential misbehaving TCP stacks from other well-behaving TCP stacks. While
this has the downside that it is not possible to immediately respond to misbehaving connections, this
approach is considerably more scalable as a per connection management has an overhead. Moreover,
the results in Section 3.4 show that short-lived connections (i.e., less than 1 second) are not able to
obtain a significant gain from misbehaving.
4.2. Step 2: Outlier detection
The goal of this and the following step is to divide the different flows passing through the
router into different groups, called profiles. These profiles represent different behaviors that can
be observed amongst the connections and are identified through an outlier detection mechanism
and clustering mechanism. Both mechanisms perform their calculations based on four previously
described features: RTT, connection duration, CWR ratio and ECE ratio. Thus, the connection’s rate
and number of acknowledged packets per ACK are not used as clustering features.
To ensure that a single misbehaving connection is also detected, we perform an outlier
detection beforehand. This outlier detection is performed through the Local Outlier Factor (LOF)
algorithm [43], which is a density-based algorithm that is also used in data mining to detect outliers.
As such, it is ideal for performing anomaly detection: the detection of a single out of profile behavior
out of a large set of connections that behave similarly.
The LOF algorithm was chosen because it has an interesting property with respect to its parameter
k. Because the algorithm calculates the density with its k nearest neighbors, a cluster with k + 1
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Figure 6. Graphical overview of an illustrative 2-dimensional outlier calculation for a group of 6 instances
(a) and 5 instances (b). As k is set to 5, only the group of 5 instances are identified as outliers.
instances will not be identified as k + 1 outliers but as a cluster. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which
shows the LOF calculation for an instance, marked as X , part as a group of 6 instances (Figure 6(a))
and a group of 5 instances (Figure 6(b)), respectively. Note that we focus on a 2-dimensional
outlier detection here, while in reality our problem is 4-dimensional. In both calculations, k was
set to 5. As shown, the group with 6 instances is not considered as having outliers because its 5
nearest neighbors are close to each other. If one instance is removed from that group, the LOF
calculation also takes into account the next nearest neighbor which is part of a complete different
group. Therefore, the LOF value is much higher and these instances are identified as outliers. In our
algorithm, this characteristic is used to configure the k value in the LOF algorithm. Since an outlier
can represent a misbehaving connection, it is important not to miss any outliers. Therefore, k is set
to C − 1, where C is the minimum number of instances needed in the clustering algorithm to form
a cluster.
In terms of runtime complexity, the LOF algorithm consists of two sequential steps: a
materialization step and a LOF value calculation step. For datasets with a low dimensionality, which
is the case in our approach with only 4 dimensions, the runtime complexity of both steps is O(n).
Since the two steps are sequential the runtime complexity of the outlier detection step is O(n). We
refer to [43] for more information about the runtime complexity for higher dimensional datasets.
4.3. Step 3: Clustering
Once the outliers are identified and removed from the dataset, the remaining instances are clustered
using a regular clustering mechanism, according to the four features used also in the outlier detection
step. In the algorithm, each cluster is considered as a separate profile. Since it is not possible to
know beforehand how many clusters remain in the dataset, after the outliers are removed, we use
the DBScan clustering algorithm [44] as this is one of the few algorithms that don’t require to
define the number of clusters beforehand. In terms of runtime complexity, the DBScan clustering
algorithm is able to find clusters inO(nlogn) time, with the aid of an indexing structure that requires
O(n2) memory. Note that, since we cluster on four distinct features, it is likely that we will have a
high number of clusters including the outliers that were identified from the previous step. Not all of
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these clusters will correspond with misbehaving profiles. It is the responsibility of the next step to
accurately label these clusters into well-behaving, misbehaving or unknown.
4.4. Step 4: Labeling of misbehaving connections
The output of the previous step is a set of profiles, where it is known that each profile represents
a different behavior with respect to the four clustered features. To goal of this last step is to label
each connection as being either misbehaving, well-behaving or unknown based on its membership
to the current and previous clusters. The labeling algorithm that is responsible for this is illustrated
in Algorithm 1. The labeling algorithm starts out with an initial labeling, performed at the previous
time step n− 1 (or a labeling in which all connections are labeled as unknown during the first run).
It will construct a new set of labels, denoted as Ln by calculating a value in the range between -1
and 1, where the range [−1, −13 ] denotes a well-behaving connection, the range ]−13 , 13 ] denotes an
unknown connection and the connections with range ] 13 , 1] are defined to be misbehaving.
To do this, the labeling algorithm first constructs an initial mapping of all profiles (not
connections) to a value -1, 0 or 1 based only on the current state of the monitored flow statistics.
This initial mapping is defined by the variableM. First, profiles that have insufficient or too noisy
information to decide on a mapping are labeled as unknown. As shown in Algorithm 1, two events
can trigger this. (1) In comparing their connection’s duration with the parameter 1, the duration
is detected to be too short (lines 6 - 10). (2) The standard deviation of rates (in percentage) of the
connections belonging to the profile is too high, compared to the parameter 2, to yield any useful
information about the average rate of that cluster (lines 11-16). This can occur since we don’t use
the connection’s rate as a feature, to avoid that bottlenecks on other nodes or at the sender or receiver
(i.e., application-limited connections) can play a role. The impact of both 1 and 2 are evaluated in
Section 6.
After filtering out the unknown profiles, the labeling algorithm needs to decide which profiles are
misbehaving and which profiles are labeled as well-behaving. To address this, the different profiles
are compared based on the rate of the cluster centroids. First, we calculate an estimation of the
theoretical throughput of the connections belonging to this profile based on the equation on line
19. This equation was derived from [45], which presents a well-known model for characterizing the
throughput of TCP connections in steady state. In this equation, b denotes the number of packets
that are acknowledged by an ACK, T0 is the timeout before sending unacknowledged packets (and
is estimated through [46]), and l denotes the packet loss on a link. We set l to a value close to
zero to correspond with non-lossy links: this makes the calculated value expected an estimation of
the throughput but this is, for our purposes, sufficient. Based on the calculated value expected, a
new feature is extracted (line 20) that denotes how much the average rate of that profile exceeds
the expected throughput. Note that we only take into account the rate that exceeds the expected
throughput. If the rate of a profile is lower than what is theoretically expected, the calculated
value for this feature will be 0. As such, this avoids that rate limited connections (e.g., because
of constrained sender or receiver window sizes or because of another bottleneck) are labeled as
misbehaving.
Based on the constructed D that contains the newly calculated feature for every profile, the LOF
algorithm is again applied to detect outliers. The LOF algorithm will detect those profiles that have
an abnormal high rate compared to other profiles. Detected outliers are labeled as misbehaving (lines
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1: Given Ln, labeling at time n
2: Set P to clustered profiles
3: D ← φ
4: M← φ
5: for all p ∈ P do
6: d←
p.size∑
i=1
duration(p(i))
7: if d < 1 then
8: P ← P\{p}
9: M←M∪ {p→ 0}
10: else
11: std← STDEV (rate(p(1)), ..., rate(p(p.size)))
12: r ←
p.size∑
i=1
rate(p(i))
13: if std > 2 then
14: P ← P\{p}
15: M←M∪ {p→ 0}
16: else
17: RTT ← p.centroid.RTT
18: b← p.centroid.PacketACK
19: expected← 1
RTT (p)
√
2bl
3 +T0min(1,3
√
3bl
8 )l(1+32l
2)
20: D ← D ∪ {max(0, r − expected)→ p}
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
24: Outliers← LOF (D)
25: for all o ∈ Outliers do
26: M←M∪ {o→ 1}
27: end for
28: for all p ∈ P\Outliers do
29: M←M∪ {p→ −1}
30: end for
31: for all p ∈ P do
32: for all c ∈ p do
33: Ln = wLn−1 + (1− w)M(p)
34: end for
35: end for
Algorithm 1: Algorithmic description of the labeling algorithm that labels the clustered profiles as
misbehaving, well-behaving or unknown.
25-27), while the others are labeled as well-behaving (lines 28-30). Finally, the constructed labeling
of profiles to misbehaving, unknown and well-behaving is smoothed and mapped to connections. To
do this, an exponentially weighted moving average is calculated that, for each connection, combines
the previous labeling of that connection with the novel labeling, based on the membership to the
profile.
To derive the runtime complexity of the labeling algorithm, the algorithm can be split up in three
steps: the mapping of the profiles (lines 5 - 23), the 2nd pass of outlier detection (lines 24 - 30)
and the mapping of profile labels to connection labels (lines 31 - 35). The runtime complexity
of the first step is O(n), with n the number of connections, as the algorithm will needs to run
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over all connections only once (grouped per profile). The runtime complexity of the second step
is considerably less than in Section 4.2 as the LOF calculation occurs on the profiles and not on
the connections. As such it is still linear O(n), but with n the number of to be decided profiles.
Finally, the runtime complexity of the last step is obviously also O(n) as it just runs through every
connection. As such, the total complexity of the labeling algorithm is O(n).
Overall, the runtime complexity of the complete detection algorithm is at most O(nlogn), with
n being the number of connections in the system. As the detection algorithm is executed at a
low frequency of only once every second, this runtime complexity is sufficiently low to provide
a scalable solution to the detection problem.
4.5. Rationale behind a cognitive approach
In essence, the cognitive algorithm labels connections as well-behaving or misbehaving based on
the value of the connection statistics. This may seem a behavior that can easily be implemented by
performing a simple threshold analysis on the connection statistics, which labels a connection as
misbehaving if a threshold is exceeded. However, we argue that there are number of reasons why a
cognitive approach outperforms such a simple algorithm.
• Robustness against network changes: First, a cognitive approach is better suited against
changes in the network itself. The derived connection features can easily differ depending
on the context of the network scenario. If in this case, misbehaving connections are present
the detection algorithm still needs to distinguish between the two profiles. As such, the relative
position of the different profiles is of importance and not the values themselves. The clustering
algorithm takes care of this as clustering only focuses on finding groups of data and disregards
the scale of the values. In an algorithm that performs threshold comparison this issue could
be solved by normalizing the data. However, in this case, the existence of outliers can result
in loss of information in the normalization process.
• Robustness against connection changes: Changes can also occur in the connections
themselves. As discussed in Section 3, we varied the percentage of ECN messages that are
ignored to introduce different levels of nodes misbehaving. Ignoring only a fraction of the
ECN messages can be used by misbehaving connections to mask their defectiveness. In a
threshold comparison algorithm, such connections could be labeled as well-behaving as they
do not exceed the crisp border, defined by the threshold. The clustering algorithm allows for a
more smooth transition as no crisp threshold is used for dividing the connections into clusters.
• No training set required: A common downside of some types of cognitive approaches is that
it requires to be trained to the actual scenario before deployment. As the techniques used
are anomaly detection and clustering, the algorithm uses only unsupervised machine learning
techniques. This means that it does not need a training set to learn its expected behavior before
deployment. Instead, a priori knowledge about the desired relative position of each profile is
used to decide on the misbehaving of a profile.
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5. PENALIZATION OF MISBEHAVING CONNECTIONS
Once the connections have been identified, the well-behaving and misbehaving connections are
assigned to different classes, where each class receives a separate AQM behavior. We propose
a simple but effective penalization action to support such a differentiated AQM behavior. The
goal is to modify the AQM policy of those connections that violate the overall network fairness.
Connections belonging to the well-behaving class are therefore not modified by the AQM system,
as they already feature the desired behavior.
On the other hand, connections belonging to the misbehaving class are considered to be less
reliable and therefore penalized. Since we focus on misbehaving TCP stacks with respect to ECN
signals, the penalization consists of modifying the ECN support of the misbehaving class. Since
connections belonging to the misbehaving class are assumed to not respond well to ECN signals,
no ECN signals are sent to these connections. Hence, the misbehaving flows are treated as non-
ECN flows. Instead, packets that would normally be marked with a congestion experienced flag
are immediately dropped from the queue. This has the effect that the misbehaving TCP stacks no
longer need to react to ECN signals, and the lowering of the sending rate is immediately triggered
because of packet loss. This would eventually also happen as the misbehaving of a sender or receiver
leads to a continuous increase of the queue, and, in the end, to data loss as well. However, in this
case, only connections belonging to the misbehaving class are affected by an increase in packet
loss, while connections belonging to the well-behaving class continue to receive ECN signals.
Disabling the ECN marking, i.e. treating the misbehaving connections as non-ECN flows, also has
an impact on the connection’s CWR and ECE count attributes. As no ECN signals are received,
these ECN statistics will also be zero. Connections that are labeled as misbehaving do not provide
any useful information anymore for the detection algorithm, and are therefore removed from the set
of connections on which the misbehaving is determined by this step. Note that this approach has
similarities with the earlier discussed Comcast approach [17]. However, in our case, the priority is
changed by changing the ECN support. This is also in line with the recommendations made for the
design of a penalty box, as originally described in the ECN specification RFC [4].
To avoid the penalization of misbehaving connections, the decision on which connections are
mapped to the different classes is not solely based on the detection algorithm, detailed in the
previous section. Instead, a hysteresis is introduced to avoid the oscillation of the output of the
detection algorithm. The introduced hysteresis consists of an exponential back-off algorithm: if
a connection is mapped as misbehaving a timer starts that lasts for T seconds. After that, the
connection is labeled as unknown again. Once it is labeled as unknown, the value for the timer
T is updated. Each time the detection algorithm marks the connection as misbehaving, the T
value is decreased with 1 second; if the detection algorithm marks the connection as misbehaving
again, the T value is doubled, and the connection is penalized, but this time for a longer period.
New connections are thus given the benefit of a doubt, while connections that continue to give
misbehaving detection results are penalized for increasing longer periods. A good guideline for
configuring the initial value of T is twice the granularity of the detection algorithm execution.
Hence, as our detection algorithm runs once every second, T is initially configured at 2 seconds.
This means that, the labeling of a connection as misbehaving will result in the disabling of ECN
marking for 2 seconds or 2 runs of the detection algorithm. If after that, the labeling decision is
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consistent and again labeled as misbehaving, the ECN marking of the misbehaving connection will
be disabled for a longer time.
Without this exponential back-off algorithm, connections that are mistakenly labeled as
misbehaving would continue to be penalized, since connections with a misbehaving label are
no longer considered in the detection algorithm. The exponential back-off algorithm allows to
periodically probe if connections were not mistakenly labeled. The frequency at which this probing
occurs decreases as the number of times the connection is labelled as misbehaving from the detection
algorithm increases.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESULTS
We evaluated the performance of the cognitive accountability mechanism by characterizing the
accuracy of the detection algorithm on one hand and the overall gain of the penalization action
on the other hand. As network scenario, the network model as presented in Section 3.3 was used,
consisting of two bottlenecks of which only 25% of the client terminals are affected by the 20 Mbps
bottleneck. We investigated the effect of the presence of both the AdaptiveIgnore, IgnoreSenX and
IgnoreRecx type of misbehaving connections and varied both the share and the level of misbehaving.
In all experiments, the parameter k of the outlier detection algorithm was set to 5, as the DBScan
clustering algorithm was configured to interpret a group of 6 instances as a cluster. Each experiment
was repeated 100 times: the variations between iterations were due to variations in the probabilistic
models used to describe the inter-arrival time of requests and connection volume.
6.1. Detection evaluation results
As the use of penalization has an impact on the dataset used for detecting misbehaving senders
and/or receivers, we disabled the penalization algorithm in this set of experiments. This allows
focusing on the accuracy of the detection algorithm avoiding any noise from errors in the detection
process. As performance metrics, we focus on the precision and recall of the detection, where the
labeling of misbehaving connections is seen as a positive labeling and the labeling of well-behaving
connections is seen as a negative labeling. We first derive suitable values for the 1 and 2 parameters
and then characterize the impact of an increasing share of misbehaving TCP stacks and level of
misbehaving as well as different RTT configurations. The RTT values for these experiments were
set to RTT1 = 10 msec. RTT2 = 30 msec and RTT3 = 50 msec, unless otherwise stated.
6.1.1. Impact of parameters
1 parameter In this experiment, we evaluate the relationship between the position of the
detection algorithm in the connection and the detection accuracy. We characterize the precision
and recall of labeling a connection after having monitored x seconds of the connection, in which
x is varied. As such, this experiment allows deriving a suitable value for the 1 parameter. To be
able to investigate all values of x, we set 1 to zero. Furthermore, the average share of misbehaving
connections was set to 30%. Figure 7 illustrates the precision and recall for an increasing x value
for different types of misbehaving TCP stacks. The 2 parameter was set to 0.15.
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Figure 7. Precision and recall for the detection algorithm as a function of the position of the detection
algorithm in the connection. This position value allows finding a well-performing 1 value.
Overall, we can observe an increasing precision and recall given an increasing x value. This means
that increasing the 1 parameter will lead to an increased detection accuracy as connections which
are too short or only just being monitored are labeled as unknown instead of, often faulty, labeled
as well-behaving or misbehaving. Of course, there is a trade-off in finding this value: if we increase
the 1 parameter, the number of connections being labeled as unknown will increase. As such, the
best suited value for 1 is the smallest value that maximizes the precision and recall. As shown in
Figure 7, for our experiments this is approximately 1.2 seconds. This means that connections that
last longer than 1.2 seconds or are only started less than a second ago should be labeled as unknown.
This is acceptable as the experiments discussed in Section 3.4 showed that no real gain can be made
from misbehaving if the connections last less than a second.
When comparing the obtained precision and recall values we see that a slightly higher precision
can be obtained. The maximum precision value, hence using a 1 > 1.2sec, is between 98.04%
and 99.87%, while the maximum recall values are between 93.12% and 95.17%. For the detection
algorithm’s accuracy, this means that the algorithm almost never labels a connection as misbehaving
if it is in fact well-behaving (i.e., false positives). On the other hand, the detection algorithm needs
to tolerate some more false negatives, i.e. misbehaving connections who are not detected. This is
an acceptable behavior as it is better to not detect misbehaving stacks than to falsely label well-
behaving stacks as misbehaving.
Figure 7 also indicates that there is a difference in the detection accuracy between various types
of misbehaving TCP stacks. Misbehaving senders are clearly easier to detect than misbehaving
receivers. This can be seen by the higher precision and recall values for misbehaving senders
earlier on in the connection. However, if the connection is monitored sufficiently long, i.e. more
than 1 = 1.2 seconds, both the precision and recall values for various types of misbehaving stacks
converge more or less to the same value. Overall, the detection algorithm achieves a very good
accuracy. For this experiment and an 1 parameter set to 1.2, the average precision and recall
values (averaged across all types of misbehaving stacks) is 98.63% and 94.15%, respectively. In
the remainder of this section, the 1 value was set to 1.2 seconds for all experiments as this was
shown to provide a good performance.
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Figure 8. Impact of the 2 parameter in terms of the precision and recall, characterizing the accuracy of the
detection algorithm, and the number of connections with a decision, characterizing the connections that are
not labeled as ’unknown’.
2 parameter The impact of the 2 parameter on the detection algorithm’s performance is
illustrated in Figure 8. In this figure, the precision and recall values are shown to characterize
the accuracy. Additionally, we also characterize the relative share of connections with a label
misbehaving or well-behaving (i.e., the connections with a decision). The values are averaged across
all types of misbehaving senders and receivers. We focused on senders and receivers who ignore all
messages (i.e., IgnoreSen100 and IgnoreRec100) or adaptively ignore congestion warnings (i.e.,
AdaptiveIgnore). Each type of misbehaving sender or receiver received an equal share of the total
number of misbehaving connections. Similarly to the previous experiment, the share of misbehaving
connections was set to 30%.
As discussed in Section 4.4, the 2 parameter will tune the amount of connections that are labeled
unknown because the standard deviation of the cluster’s connection rate is higher than 2. As shown
in Figure 8, the lower the value of 2 is, the better the precision and recall values seem to be. There
is however a significant downside to a very low 2 value. If 2 is low, the number of connections
that will be rejected and labelled as unknown will be very high: as such, there will be only a few
connections with an actual decision. For example, with an 2 value set to zero, only 9.8% of the
connections are labelled with a decision. This 9.8% of the connections mainly correspond with the
outliers as detected by the LOF algorithm (which have a standard deviation of zero). Increasing
2, obviously increases the number of connections with a decision. The optimal 2 value must thus
satisfy the trade-off that (i) the precision and recall values are still considerably high and (ii) a
sufficient number of connections are labelled with a decision. In our experiment, this value is in the
range of 0.15 to 0.20 as this is the value that corresponds with a precision and recall of approximately
98% and 94% and at the same time approximately 90% of all connections are labelled with a
decision. Note that this justifies why 2 = 0.15 was chosen in the previous experiment. As shown,
the number of connections with a decision increases slowly further, given an increasing 2 but not
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Figure 9. Precision and recall for an increasing share of misbehaving TCP stacks.
until 100%. This is because connections are also labeled as unknown because of the 1 value, which
identifies short-duration connections.
6.1.2. Impact of the share of misbehaving TCP stacks The precision and recall of the detection
algorithm as a function of the share of misbehaving TCP stacks is illustrated in Figure 9.
For this experiment, we focused on the AdaptiveIgnore, IgnoreSen100 and IgnoreRec100 type
of misbehaving TCP stacks (similar to the previous experiment). The labeling algorithm was
configured with 1 = 1.2 and 2 = 0.15. As shown, the recall is only marginally influenced by an
increasing share of misbehaving TCP stacks. With the exception of a small drop in recall when
only 10% of connections are misbehaving, the recall remains stable at 94.15%. The precision is also
fairly stable, although somewhat more impacted by the lower share of misbehaving connections. As
shown, the precision suffers from a drop in the region 10% to 30%. However, overall, the detection
algorithm remains to be very accurate with precision values in the range between 82.15% (10% of
misbehaving connections) and 98.63% (40% of misbehaving connections and more).
6.1.3. Impact of the level of misbehaving TCP stacks In this experiment, we investigate the impact
of an increasing level of misbehaving TCP stacks. We focus only on the precision of the algorithm
as the recall has shown to be very stable (similar to the previous results). For this experiment, 30% of
all connections were misbehaving of which 50% were misbehaving senders and the remainder were
misbehaving receivers. Figure 10 investigates the precision values for both types of misbehaving
stacks as a function of the percentage of ignored congestion warnings. As shown, the best precision
can be obtained when misbehaving TCP stacks ignore more than 50% of all congestion warnings.
In this case, a precision of 99.87% and 98.04% can be achieved in detecting misbehaving senders
and receivers, respectively. If only a small fraction of the congestion warnings are ignored, a
considerable drop in precision is experienced. For example, when only 10% of the warnings are
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Figure 10. Precision and recall for an increasing level of misbehaving in TCP stacks.
ignored, 87.12% of all misbehaving receivers can be detected, while 92.54% of all misbehaving
senders can be detected.
In our opinion, this result is still acceptable for two reasons. First, although we perceive a drop in
precision, the drop is notable but still limited. On average, approximately 9 out of 10 misbehaving
connections can be detected. Additionally, the precision increases very quickly if more congestion
warning messages are ignored. Second, the gain that can be achieved by ignoring only a small
fraction of the congestion warnings is very limited. The results in Section 3.4 already showed
that ignoring less congestion warnings results in a reduction in the gain that can be achieved by
misbehaving. For example, for connections with an average duration of 10 seconds, ignoring half
of the congestion warnings results in a gain which is only half of when all congestion warnings
are ignored. For lower percentages of ignored congestion warnings, this gain is even considerably
lower. For example, if 10% of all congestion warnings are ignored, the achieved gain is less than
10% compared to well-behaving stacks. As such, the impact of these misbehaving TCP stacks on
the overall fairness between connections is limited. Hence, the issue of not detecting 1 out of 10
misbehaving connections is less severe.
6.1.4. Impact of differences in RTT As the obtained throughput of a connection is inverse
proportional with the RTT of that connection, there is an important link between the fairness of
connections and their RTT. In the detection algorithm, we use the estimated RTT value of the
ANTMA algorithm as an attribute in the clustering and outlier detection process. As such, the
detection algorithm is able to cope with differences in RTT amongst connections. Since already
different RTT values were configured for all three sites in the experimental setup, the previous
results already confirmed that a high precision and accuracy can be obtained, even if differences
exist in the RTT between connections. In this section, we evaluate the stability of these precision
and recall values for different RTT configurations.
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RTT1 = 30, RTT2 = 30 RTT1 = 10, RTT2 = 30 RTT1 = 10, RTT2 = 50
RTT3 = 30 RTT3 = 50 RTT3 = 100
P R P R P R
IgnoreSen100 99.98% 98.42% 99.87% 95.17% 98.11% 94.18%
AdaptiveIgnore 99.01% 97.13% 98.14% 93.46% 97.82% 92.87%
IgnoreRec100 98.78% 97.13% 98.04% 93.12% 97.78% 92.59%
Table I. Precision (P) and recall (R) values for different types of misbehaving TCP stacks under various RTT
configurations (in msec) for the 3 investigated sites.
Table I characterizes both the precision (P) and recall (R) for different types of misbehaving TCP
stacks and under 3 different configurations of RTT values for the 3 sites in the experimental setup.
As shown, the results do not diverge a lot across different RTT configurations and confirm the earlier
observations in the previous sections. For all RTT values, we observe a higher precision value than
recall value, i.e. resulting in slightly more false negatives than false positives. Overall, the precision
and recall values are high and do not change considerably under varying RTT configurations. This
shows that the accuracy of the detection algorithm is stable under varying RTT configurations.
Although the difference is limited, there is a small increase in accuracy when the RTT values do not
diverge a lot. Indeed, the results in the column 3 and 4 show a slightly higher precision and recall
value than compared to the other configuration. This can be expected as the problem of accurately
detecting misbehaving connections is reduced if there is no real difference between the obtained
RTT values.
6.2. Penalization evaluation results
While the previous section focused on an off-line detection accuracy evaluation, in this section,
we characterize the gain of of the complete system, including the penalization action proposed in
Section 5. Therefore, the detection algorithm was deployed on-line and its output was provided to
the penalization algorithm that includes the exponential back-off algorithm with T initially set to 5
seconds. The same experimental setup configuration was used as investigated in Section 3.4. The
connection monitoring step generated an updated statistics value every second and also triggered the
detection algorithm and, ultimately, the penalization action. We investigate the impact of applying
penalization to the detected connections by characterizing the gain that can be achieved under the
same conditions as discussed in Section 3.4.
6.2.1. Number of concurrent connections Figure 11 compares the gain achieved by misbehaving
TCP stacks as a function of the number of concurrent connections. Without penalization, we
observe the same results as discussed in Section 3.4: a relative gain of up to 1541.19% can be
achieve by misbehaving, which diminishes as the number of concurrent connections increases. As
shown in Figure 11, applying penalization to the detected misbehaving TCP stacks successfully
reduces this relative gain. In all cases, the relative gain achieved by penalized connections is
close to 100%. Note that 100% means that there is no difference between misbehaving and well-
behaving connections: a relative gain below 100% means that misbehaving connections experience
a lower throughput than the well-behaving connections. Although the relative gain is close to
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Figure 11. Gain achieved by misbehaving TCP senders and receivers with and without penalization as a
function of the number of concurrent connections.
100% for a small number of concurrent connections, applying penalization cannot completely
avoid that misbehaving connections achieve some gain in misbehaving. For example, penalized
misbehaving senders and receivers achieve an average gain of 132.52% and 120.78%, respectively.
This is however a considerable reduction of the achieved relative gain for misbehaving senders
and receivers without penalization (1014.57% and 1541.19%, respectively). As the number of
concurrent connections increases, the achieved relative gain of penalized misbehaving connections
is diminished. For 50 concurrent connections, the average relative gain is 105.25% and 104.17% for
misbehaving senders and respectively. For 100 concurrent connections and more, no additional gain
can be achieved by misbehaving. When comparing the gain between penalized misbehaving senders
and receivers, we see that they have a similar but not equal relative gain. Similar to the unpenalized
case, misbehaving senders achieve a consistently higher gain than misbehaving receivers. However,
because of penalization, the difference in gain can be reduced to a few percents.
6.2.2. Connection duration The comparison between unpenalized and penalized misbehaving
connections as a function of the connection duration is shown in Figure 12. A similar behavior
can be observed as the one discussed in the previous section. Applying penalization allows reducing
the relative gain considerably but not completely. Especially if unpenalized connections achieve a
very high gain, i.e. more than 500%, the penalizing system needs to tolerate a limited gain from
misbehaving connections. For example, for connections with an average duration of 100 seconds,
the relative gain of misbehaving senders and receivers is 110.25% and 105.55%, respectively. These
are the highest gains of penalized misbehaving connections that could be observed and for shorter
lived connections, the relative gain is considerably lower. For example, for connections with an
average duration of 10 seconds, the relative gain values that were obtained were 104.84% and
104.05% for misbehaving senders and receivers, respectively. Overall, the system is able to achieve
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Figure 12. Gain achieved by misbehaving TCP senders and receivers with and without penalization as a
function of the connection duration.
a very good performance by almost completely reducing the difference between misbehaving and
well-behaving connections.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we presented a cognitive accountability mechanism that is able to restore the fairness
between TCP connections, originally affected by the presence of misbehaving TCP senders or
receivers that (partially) ignore ECN congestion signals. The cognitive accountability mechanism
is deployed on top of a normal AQM enabled router and consists of a detection algorithm and
differentiated AQM mechanism. The detection algorithm monitors each connection passing through
the router and performs a combination of clustering and outlier detection based on the monitored
data to detect different behavioral groups, called profiles. The detection mechanism comprises a
labeling algorithm that exploits the statistics that were extracted form each profile to decide whether
or not the connections belonging to that profile are misbehaving, well-behaving or (temporarily)
unknown. The output of the detection algorithm is used to perform a differentiated AQM behavior
that divides connections into a well-behaving and misbehaving class and penalizes the misbehaving
class by disabling the ECN marking. We showed that misbehaving connections can mainly achieve
a considerable gain in network environments when (i) they have a considerable connection duration
(i.e., more than 1 second) and (ii) a moderate number of concurrent connections or less exist (i.e.,
a few thousand concurrent connections or less). Therefore, the proposed cognitive accountability
is mainly targeted for deployment in a multimedia access network, preferably positioned close to
the receiver. Note that the approach does not immediately suffer from scalability issues if these
constraints are not met, but that there is less gain to be made in misbehaving.
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The cognitive accountability mechanism has been evaluated on a simulation environment
emulating a multimedia access network with multiple bottlenecks and three different remote sites,
having different RTT configurations. Different evaluation scenarios were introduced by varying the
type of misbehaving connections, the share of misbehaving connections, the level of misbehaving
and the network configuration itself. Both the accuracy of the detection algorithm and the achieved
fairness gain of the overall accountability mechanism has been characterized. The key findings
of the performance evaluation are the following. First, we showed that misbehaving senders and
receivers can be detected very accurately in the network environments where they achieve an actual
gain of misbehaving. In these cases, the detection algorithm has a precision of 97% and more, and a
recall of 92% and more. Second, because of a careful selection of clustering features, the detection
algorithm is robust against changes in the network configuration such as rate limits at the receiver
or sender side or differences in the RTT. We showed that differences in RTT between sites has an
impact on the accuracy but that this impact is limited (i.e., in the order of 2%). Third, the results
show that misbehaving senders are able to achieve a higher gain than misbehaving receivers but
that they are also easier to detect. Fourth, applying penalization to the misbehaving connections
allows diminishing the achieved gain by misbehaving almost completely but not fully. The results
show that a gain of up to 844% can be decreased to only 105%, which means that misbehaving
connections have an average throughput which is only 5% higher than well-behaving connections.
In some cases, we are able to completely equalize the throughput of both classes of connections.
Overall, we have shown that the proposed cognitive accountability mechanism is able to accurately
and timely detect the occurrence of misbehaving senders and receivers. Moreover, the penalization
of the misbehaving connections does indeed lead to a better overall network fairness. In future
work, we plan to investigate other types of misbehaving TCP stacks, not necessarily focusing on
misbehaving ECN behavior.
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